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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Kelvin X. Morris was convicted of first-degree murder 
and robbery and sentenced to death in 1983 following a jury 
trial in Pennsylvania state court.  Morris made several 
unsuccessful attempts to overturn his convictions and 
sentence in state court before petitioning the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for a 
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writ of habeas corpus in 2001.  After conducting an 
evidentiary hearing, the District Court found that while 
defending Morris at his original trial, his counsel had 
simultaneously represented Morris‟s brother, who was also a 
suspect in the murder, in an unrelated civil matter.  The 
District Court concluded that trial counsel‟s concurrent 
representation was an actual conflict of interest that deprived 
Morris of effective assistance of counsel, and therefore 
granted him a new trial. 
The Commonwealth appeals, contending the District 
Court erred in holding the evidentiary hearing and in ordering 
a new trial.  Although we will affirm the District Court‟s 
decision to conduct a hearing, we will vacate the order of the 
District Court and remand for further consideration of 
Morris‟s request for a new trial. 
I 
A 
 The lengthy history of this case begins tragically with 
the senseless and brutal murder of Robert McDonald some 30 
years ago.  At approximately 3:00 a.m. on the morning of 
August 9, 1980, Philadelphia police discovered a broken 
window at the auto parts store that McDonald managed.  
When McDonald arrived at the store, he inspected the 
premises with an officer but found nothing else amiss.  After 
the officer left, McDonald called a window repairman, 
William Linaberry, who met McDonald at the store at 
approximately 4:30 a.m. 
 As Linaberry worked on the window, he noticed a man 
and a group of adolescent boys at a gas station across the 
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street.  The man, who was carrying a yellow plastic bag, 
eventually approached McDonald and Linaberry and asked 
about the broken window.  As they spoke, the man drew a 
handgun from the bag and demanded money from McDonald.  
When McDonald asked, “What money?,” the man shot and 
killed him.  Linaberry avoided harm by hiding underneath his 
van. 
 Following the shooting, police showed Linaberry 
several hundred photographs, but he initially was unable to 
identify a suspect.  Several days later, police interviewed 
Ronald Johnson, who was one of the boys whom Linaberry 
had observed at the gas station before the murder.  According 
to Johnson, who was twelve years old at the time of the 
interview, a man approached the group at the gas station and 
told them to leave the area before heading across the street 
toward the auto parts store.  Although Johnson fled the scene 
as instructed, he told police that he turned as he ran and 
watched the man approach McDonald and Linaberry and 
speak with the two men before shooting one of them. 
 
 Police were able to draw a composite sketch of the 
shooter based on Johnson‟s description.  Police then showed a 
new array of photographs to Linaberry and Joseph Tyrone 
Flowers, who was another boy at the gas station.  After 
viewing the new photographs, both Linaberry and Flowers 
identified Artie Morris, Kelvin Morris‟s brother, as the man 
who had approached them at the gas station.
1
  Kelvin‟s 
                                                 
 1 For the sake of clarity, hereinafter we refer to 
Petitioner Kelvin X. Morris as “Kelvin” and to his brother, 
Artie Morris, as “Artie.” 
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picture had not been included in any of the earlier photo 
arrays. 
 Police obtained a warrant for Artie‟s arrest and 
questioned both Artie and his live-in girlfriend.  Both 
informed police that Kelvin had arrived at Artie‟s apartment 
on the afternoon of August 9, told them that he was in trouble 
for a shooting, and asked to stay with them for several days.  
Artie‟s girlfriend also indicated that family members had 
implicated Kelvin in the shooting. 
 
 Based on this new information, police showed 
Linaberry a new set of photographs that included a picture of 
Kelvin.  Linaberry immediately identified Kelvin as the 
shooter, explaining that his previous identification had been 
incorrect because Kelvin and Artie resembled one another.  
Police also showed new photo arrays to Johnson and Flowers, 
both of whom had previously chosen Artie.  Although 
Johnson this time identified Kelvin as the man who 
approached him at the gas station prior to the shooting, 
Flowers continued to maintain that Artie was the shooter. 
 
 On the strength of these new identifications, police 
obtained a warrant for Kelvin‟s arrest and located him in 
Suffolk, Virginia several months later, where he was being 
held on unrelated armed robbery charges.  During an 
interview with Suffolk police following his arrest, Kelvin 
acknowledged his involvement in the robbery and murder of 
McDonald.  Kelvin‟s roommate in Virginia, James Willie, 
also told police that Kelvin had confessed to shooting a man 
while robbing an auto parts store in Philadelphia.  After he 
was tried and convicted on the Virginia charges, Kelvin was 
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extradited to Pennsylvania to stand trial for McDonald‟s 
murder. 
B 
 On November 3, 1983, a seventeen-day jury trial 
commenced in the Philadelphia County Court of Common 
Pleas.  When Kelvin‟s first lawyer was forced to withdraw 
prior to trial because of illness, attorney Leon Tucker was 
appointed.  Unbeknownst to the court, however, Tucker was 
simultaneously representing Kelvin‟s brother, Artie, in an 
unrelated civil matter in which Artie was seeking monetary 
damages.  The trial court was never apprised of Tucker‟s 
concurrent representation of both Kelvin and Artie.
2 
 
 At trial, the Commonwealth‟s evidence consisted 
largely of the eyewitness identifications of Kelvin and his 
own inculpatory statements.  Linaberry identified Kelvin as 
the shooter, and Johnson, who was fifteen at the time of trial, 
testified that it was Kelvin who approached the group of boys 
at the gas station prior to the murder and told them to leave 
the area.  Flowers, who consistently maintained that it was 
Artie who had approached the group, did not testify. 
 
 James Willie, Kelvin‟s erstwhile roommate in 
Virginia, testified that Kelvin had admitted to shooting one of 
                                                 
 2 It was clear at the time of Kelvin‟s 1983 trial that 
Tucker had an ethical obligation to disclose this conflict to 
the trial court.  See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485-
86 (1978) (“[D]efense attorneys have the ethical obligation, 
upon discovering a conflict of interest, to advise the court at 
once of the problem.”). 
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two men while robbing an auto parts store in Philadelphia.  
According to Willie, Kelvin had explained that one of the 
men had escaped by running and hiding under a truck.  The 
Commonwealth also called Thomas Newsome, the Suffolk, 
Virginia detective who interviewed Kelvin after his arrest.  
Newsome testified that when questioned about the shooting, 
Kelvin acknowledged robbing and killing McDonald to “keep 
up with the crowd.” 
 
 Kelvin‟s defense centered around a theory of mistaken 
identity.  Attorney Tucker called two witnesses who testified 
that Kelvin was not the man who shot McDonald.  William 
Meekins, who was jogging near the store at the time of the 
murder, testified that he saw a man standing nearby holding a 
bag at about the time of the shooting who looked nothing like 
Kelvin.  Lamont Bruce, a “close” friend of Kelvin, testified 
that he was living near the store at the time of the murder.  
Bruce told the jury that he heard two shots that morning and 
looked out his window to see three younger men running 
away.  According to Bruce, none of the fleeing men was 
Kelvin. 
 
 When cross-examining Linaberry, attorney Tucker 
established that Linaberry had initially identified someone 
other than Kelvin as the shooter.  However, Tucker did not 
elicit or otherwise reveal to the jury during cross-examination 
that the man Linaberry identified was someone who 
resembled Kelvin, namely, Kelvin‟s brother and Tucker‟s 
client, Artie Morris.  In fact, Tucker actually objected when 
the Commonwealth, on re-direct, asked Linaberry to name the 
person he initially identified.  Nor did Tucker call Flowers, 
who had maintained his identification of Artie as the man 
who approached the group at the gas station. 
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 During closing arguments, Tucker attacked 
Linaberry‟s and Johnson‟s  identifications, arguing that they 
did not have a good opportunity to see the shooter‟s face and 
pointing out that both had given inconsistent identifications.  
Tucker also attacked the credibility of Willie, Kelvin‟s former 
roommate, who had been arrested for forging checks 
belonging to Kelvin‟s uncle.  Tucker did not, however, argue 
or imply that the shooter was his other client, Artie Morris. 
 
 On November 30, 1983, the jury convicted Kelvin of 
first-degree murder and robbery.  Following a penalty 
hearing, the jury found two aggravating circumstances and 
recommended a sentence of death on the murder count.  After 
a lengthy delay in resolving several post-trial motions, on 
September 8, 1987, the trial court formally imposed the jury‟s 
death sentence, along with a consecutive term of ten-to-
twenty years imprisonment on the robbery charge. 
 
C 
 After new appellate counsel was appointed, Kelvin 
sought direct review of his convictions and sentence, 
asserting numerous errors.  Although Kelvin argued on appeal 
that Tucker‟s performance at trial was ineffective for several 
reasons, he did not raise the issue of Tucker‟s conflict of 
interest in either his post-trial motions or on direct appeal.  
On September 22, 1989, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
affirmed Kelvin‟s convictions and death sentence.  See 
Commonwealth v. Morris, 564 A.2d 1226 (Pa. 1989). 
 
 Kelvin then sought to overturn his convictions and 
sentence under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act 
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(PCRA), 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 9541 et seq.  Kelvin filed a pro 
se PCRA petition on April 2, 1990, which a new court-
appointed attorney amended on October 18, 1993.  Although 
Kelvin claimed that Tucker‟s trial performance was 
constitutionally ineffective for various reasons, he nowhere 
mentioned Tucker‟s concurrent representation of Artie.  
Kelvin was denied PCRA relief on January 18, 1995, and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court later affirmed that ruling.  See 
Commonwealth v. Morris, 684 A.2d 1037 (Pa. 1996), cert. 
denied, 521 U.S. 1106 (1997). 
 
 On November 2, 1996, Artie died.  Just over one 
month later, Kelvin filed a second pro se PCRA petition 
claiming, for the first time, that Tucker‟s simultaneous 
representation of Artie in the civil suit had created a conflict 
of interest that deprived Kelvin of the effective assistance of 
counsel during trial.  Kelvin requested an evidentiary hearing 
and argued that the new claims raised in his second PCRA 
petition were not time-barred because Pennsylvania‟s 
“relaxed waiver rule” permitted the court to review untimely 
claims in capital cases.  The Philadelphia County Court of 
Common Pleas refused to hold a hearing and dismissed 
Kelvin‟s second PCRA petition on December 21, 1999, 
holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review his claims 
because the petition had been filed beyond the PCRA‟s one-
year statute of limitations.  See 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 9545(b).  
On May 1, 2003, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed 
the lower court‟s conclusion that Kelvin‟s second PCRA 
petition was time-barred.  See Commonwealth v. Morris, 822 
A.2d 684 (Pa. 2003). 
 
D 
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 On June 20, 2001, Kelvin filed the present petition for 
federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
3
  
Kelvin‟s § 2254 petition raised many of the same claims as 
his second PCRA petition and likewise alleged that Tucker‟s 
concurrent representation of both Kelvin and Artie had 
created an actual conflict of interest that deprived Kelvin of 
effective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of the 
trial. 
 
 The Commonwealth initially argued that the claims 
presented in Kelvin‟s § 2254 petition were procedurally 
defaulted because he had failed to comply with the PCRA‟s 
one-year statute of limitation.   As such, contended the 
Commonwealth, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to 
review Kelvin‟s § 2254 claims because the denial of his 
claims was supported by an independent and adequate state 
                                                 
 3 This habeas petition is actually Kelvin‟s second.  On 
October 28, 1997, Kelvin filed an initial § 2254 petition in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania while his second PCRA 
petition was still pending.  Kelvin‟s first § 2254 petition was 
dismissed without prejudice as a “mixed petition” under Rose 
v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), on March 18, 1998.  When 
Kelvin filed the present habeas petition in June 2001, the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania stayed proceedings pending 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court‟s consideration of the denial 
of Kelvin‟s second PCRA petition.  When the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief in May 
2003, this Court transferred Kelvin‟s § 2254 petition to Judge 
Rodriguez of the District of New Jersey, sitting by 
designation in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, for further 
consideration. 
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ground.  The District Court disagreed, holding that our 
decision in Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700 (3d Cir. 2005), 
effectively precluded the Commonwealth‟s procedural default 
argument. 
 In Bronshtein, we explained that the PCRA‟s one-year 
statute of limitations was not an adequate state bar to federal 
habeas review of claims defaulted prior to, at the very least, 
October 20, 1998.  Id at 709.  Before that date, Pennsylvania 
courts frequently applied a “relaxed waiver” rule in capital 
cases.  Id.  In other words, courts refused to enforce 
procedural rules—such as the PCRA‟s one-year statute of 
limitations—in capital cases because of the “overwhelming 
public interest in preventing unconstitutional executions.”  Id. 
at 708 (quoting Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383 A.2d 174, 
180-81 (Pa. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Although a trio of Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions in 
1998 and 1999 interred the relaxed waiver doctrine, see, e.g, 
Commonwealth v. Banks, 726 A.2d 374 (Pa. 1999), we 
observed in Bronshtein that it was not clear that the rule 
would be unavailable as of October 20, 1998—the date of 
Bronshtein‟s default.  See 404 F.3d at 709-10.  Because the 
PCRA‟s one-year statute of limitations “was not firmly 
established and regularly followed” as of that date, we held it 
was an inadequate state bar to federal habeas review of 
Bronshtein‟s claims.  Id. 
 Applying Bronshtein to the present case, the District 
Court held that the PCRA‟s one-year statute of limitations 
was not an adequate state bar to federal habeas review of 
Kelvin‟s claims because his default had occurred, at the latest, 
in 1996—well before the Bronshtein petitioner‟s default.  
Morris v. Beard, No. 01-3070, 2007 WL 1795689, at *12-*13 
(E.D. Pa. June 20, 2007).  Indeed, the Commonwealth 
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eventually conceded that our holding in Bronshtein was fatal 
to its procedural default argument.  Id. at *12 n.18. 
 Turning to the merits of Kelvin‟s § 2254 petition, the 
District Court vacated his death sentence on June 20, 2007 
after finding that Tucker had provided ineffective assistance 
of counsel during the penalty phase for reasons unrelated to 
the alleged conflict of interest at trial.  See Morris, 2007 WL 
1795689, at *14-*36.  The Commonwealth has not appealed 
the decision to vacate Kelvin‟s death sentence.  See 
Appellant‟s Br. at 11 n.7. 
 The District Court next considered what it termed 
Kelvin‟s “primary” argument: that his convictions must be 
vacated because Tucker‟s concurrent representation of Artie 
created an actual conflict of interest that deprived him of 
effective assistance of counsel at trial.  See Morris, 2007 WL 
1795689, at *37.  After reviewing the trial record, the District 
Court found significant evidence suggesting that Tucker‟s 
loyalties to his client Artie—together with Tucker‟s own 
financial interest in Artie‟s civil suit—led him to forego “the 
most compelling and comprehensive defense,” id. at *37: 
painting Artie as the shooter.  See generally, id. at *37-*43.  
Significantly, the District Court determined that there was a 
causal nexus between Tucker‟s conflict of interest and his 
failure to identify Artie as the shooter before hearing Tucker‟s 
testimony in this regard.  See id. at *43 (holding not only that 
a conflict existed, but “that it adversely affected his counsel‟s 
performance”). 
 The District Court also observed that the 
Commonwealth did not dispute that Tucker simultaneously 
represented both Kelvin and his brother Artie.  Id. at *39.  
Nevertheless, the District Court concluded that “more 
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development of the existence and scope of the attorney client 
relationship between [Tucker] and Artie is required before 
relief can be granted.”  Id. at *43.  Accordingly, the District 
Court exercised its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) to 
hold an evidentiary hearing on that issue.  Id. at *44. 
E 
 The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on 
October 24, 2007, and Tucker was the only witness to testify.  
Tucker‟s testimony, together with several exhibits, confirmed 
that he had represented Artie in a civil suit on a contingency-
fee basis from September 1983 until the case was settled in 
August 1985.
4
  This period coincided with Tucker‟s 
representation of Kelvin during his seventeen-day jury trial in 
November 1983.  Tucker also confirmed that because the trial 
court was never advised of the matter, it did not conduct a 
colloquy on the record to determine whether Kelvin was 
willing to waive Tucker‟s conflict.  Nevertheless, Tucker 
maintained that he had discussed the situation with both 
Kelvin and Artie and that both had consented to his dual 
representation. 
                                                 
 4 The hearing revealed that Artie‟s suit concerned an 
eye injury he received while incarcerated in a Philadelphia 
city jail.  Artie first approached Tucker about representing 
him in August 1983.  In September of that year, Artie, Artie‟s 
mother, and Tucker all signed a contingency-fee agreement 
granting Tucker 35% of any financial award or settlement 
Artie obtained.  Artie eventually settled his suit in 1985 for 
$55,000, and Tucker received $19,500 in fees for his efforts. 
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 Tucker also testified that he and Kelvin discussed trial 
strategy “extensively” both prior to and during trial.  
According to Tucker, Kelvin was quite protective of Artie.  
For that reason, Tucker explained, it was unlikely that Kelvin 
would have allowed him to argue that Artie was the actual 
shooter.  Tucker further testified that he likely would have 
acceded to Kelvin‟s desire not to implicate his brother in the 
murder as a matter of trial strategy. 
 Although Tucker provided some probative testimony 
on direct examination by Kelvin‟s counsel, the 
Commonwealth‟s cross-examination proceeded in fits and 
starts.  Each time the Commonwealth tried to probe whether, 
in fact, Tucker failed to identify Artie as the shooter because 
of his conflict of interest (or for some unrelated reason), 
Kelvin‟s counsel objected.  See, e.g., App. at 121-28.  These 
objections resulted in several colloquies with the District 
Court regarding the scope of the evidentiary hearing.  The net 
result was that the District Court‟s pre-hearing conclusion 
that Tucker‟s conflict “adversely affected” his representation 
of Kelvin prevented Tucker from testifying freely about that 
critical issue. 
 Based on Tucker‟s testimony and the record as a 
whole, the District Court held that Tucker‟s simultaneous 
representation of Artie and Kelvin constituted an actual 
conflict that led Tucker to eschew the objectively plausible 
alternative defense strategy of portraying Artie as the shooter.  
After rejecting the Commonwealth‟s argument that Kelvin 
had knowingly and intelligently waived the conflict during 
private conversations with Tucker, the District Court granted 
Kelvin habeas relief on his conflict-of-interest claim, vacated 
his murder conviction, and remanded the matter to state court 
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for a new trial.  Kelvin‟s remaining claims were dismissed 
without prejudice as moot. 
II 
 The Commonwealth appeals, arguing that the District 
Court erred in three respects.  First, the Commonwealth 
claims the District Court erred in holding an evidentiary 
hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) because Kelvin did not 
diligently develop the factual basis for his conflict-of-interest 
claim in Pennsylvania state court.  Next, the Commonwealth 
argues the District Court erroneously found that Kelvin did 
not waive his right to conflict-free counsel.  Finally, the 
Commonwealth attacks the merits of the District Court‟s 
conflict-of-interest analysis, arguing that Kelvin did not 
demonstrate that Tucker‟s conflict led him to avoid pursuing 
a plausible alternative defense strategy. 
 Although we review the District Court‟s decision to 
hold an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion, see 
United States v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008), our 
consideration of the District Court‟s legal conclusions is 
plenary, Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 378 (3d Cir. 
2004).  We review any findings of fact drawn from the 
evidentiary hearing for clear error.  Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 
F.3d 671, 677 (3d Cir. 2006).  To the extent that state court 
factual findings are at issue in this habeas appeal, we presume 
them to be correct and will disturb them only upon a showing 
of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.  28 U.S.C. 
§2254(e)(1); Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
III 
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 We first consider the Commonwealth‟s contention that 
the District Court erred by granting Kelvin an evidentiary 
hearing on his conflict-of-interest claim.  Our inquiry 
proceeds in two stages.  First, we must determine whether the 
hearing was barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214.  If it was not, we then consider whether the 
District Court‟s decision to grant a hearing was an abuse of its 
discretion.  We address each issue in turn. 
 
A 
 Pursuant to AEDPA, district courts retain discretion to 
grant evidentiary hearings in federal habeas proceedings, 
subject to certain restrictions.  See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 
U.S. 465, 473 (2007).  Of primary significance in Kelvin‟s 
case is 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), which generally prohibits 
evidentiary hearings where the petitioner “has failed to 
develop the factual basis of a claim in state court 
proceedings.”  Under § 2254(e)(2), “a habeas court is barred 
from holding an evidentiary hearing unless the petitioner was 
diligent in his attempt to develop a factual basis for his claim 
in the state court.” Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 392 
(3d Cir. 2010); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 435 
(2000).
5
 
                                                 
 
5
 Irrespective of a petitioner‟s diligence, a district court 
may also hold a hearing if the petitioner can satisfy the 
criteria set forth in § 2254(e)(2)(A)-(B).  See Palmer v. 
Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2010).  Kelvin does 
not rely on those subsections to support the District Court‟s 
decision to hold an evidentiary hearing in his case. 
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 The principles of federalism and comity that underlie 
AEDPA in general—and § 2254(e)(2) in particular—demand 
that a petitioner first afford the state court a fair opportunity 
to develop and adjudicate his claims before seeking federal 
habeas relief.  See Williams, 529 U.S. at 436-37; see also 
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999).  
Accordingly, whether a petitioner first pursued an evidentiary 
hearing in state court in the manner provided by state law is 
central to the diligence analysis under § 2254(e)(2).  
Williams, 529 U.S. at 437. 
 In this appeal, the parties agree that Kelvin sought an 
evidentiary hearing on his conflict-of-interest claim in state 
court when he filed his second PCRA petition in 1996.  The 
state court, however, denied Kelvin a hearing and dismissed 
his petition without addressing its merits after deeming it 
untimely under the PCRA‟s one-year statute of limitations.  
Though the District Court recognized that the state court had 
dismissed the claim as time-barred, it reiterated its finding 
that the PCRA‟s statute of limitations was an inadequate bar 
to federal relief and thus concluded that Kelvin had made a 
sufficient attempt to develop the record in state court.  
Accordingly, the District Court held that § 2254(e)(2) did not 
bar a hearing. 
 Noting the lengthy delay and suspicious timing of 
Kelvin‟s conflict-of-interest claim, the Commonwealth argues 
that Kelvin was anything but diligent in developing his 
claim‟s factual predicate.  The Commonwealth now concedes, 
as it must in light of Bronshtein, that Kelvin‟s conflict of 
interest claim is not procedurally defaulted.  Nevertheless, it 
contends that the standard for determining whether a state 
procedural rule is an adequate bar to federal habeas relief is 
distinct from the analysis of whether a petitioner was diligent 
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in developing a particular claim under § 2254(e)(2).  The 
Commonwealth asserts that the District Court mistakenly 
conflated the two analyses and held erroneously that Kelvin 
had been diligent in developing his conflict-of-interest claim 
simply because it found the PCRA‟s time bar inadequate.  
According to the Commonwealth, Kelvin‟s thirteen-year 
delay dooms his request for a hearing, regardless of whether 
the PCRA‟s statute of limitations is valid. 
 The Commonwealth‟s argument is not without force.  
It strains credulity to say that Kelvin “diligently” developed 
his conflict-of-interest claim in the traditional sense of the 
word.  Despite knowing of Tucker‟s concurrent 
representation during his 1983 trial, Kelvin waited until 1996 
to raise the issue.  In doing so, he passed up numerous 
opportunities to make his claim; neither his post-trial motions, 
nor his direct appeal, nor his first PCRA petition mention 
Tucker‟s conflict.  Conveniently, it was not until November 
1996, just one month after Artie died, that Kelvin first 
claimed that Tucker‟s dual representation created a conflict 
that led him to avoid portraying Artie as the shooter. 
 Nevertheless, we are constrained to agree with the 
District Court that Kelvin was “diligent” in the technical 
sense that the term is used for purposes of § 2254(e)(2).  As 
the Commonwealth points out, we observed in Wilson v. 
Beard, 426 F.3d 653 (3d Cir. 2005), that the standards for 
determining procedural default and diligence under § 
2254(e)(2) are not coterminous.  Id. at 665 n.10.  Yet we 
further explained that the two standards are “analytically 
linked.” Id. at 665 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 432).  Thus, 
when “a petitioner requests a hearing to develop the record on 
a claim in state court, and if the state courts . . . deny that 
request on the basis of an inadequate state ground, the 
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petitioner has not „failed to develop the factual basis of [the] 
claim in State court proceedings‟ for purposes of 
§2254(e)(2).”  Id.  (brackets in original).6 
 This is precisely the scenario we confront in this 
appeal.  As noted above, in assessing a petitioner‟s diligence, 
we focus on whether he sought an evidentiary hearing in the 
manner required by state law.  See Williams, 529 U.S. at 437.  
Here, Kelvin did so in his second PCRA petition by raising 
Tucker‟s conflict of interest, submitting preliminary evidence 
on the issue, and requesting an evidentiary hearing to develop 
the claim further.  Thus, this is not a case where the petitioner 
never raised the claim or never sought a hearing in state court, 
or where the petitioner was “given a hearing on a claim in 
state court but nonetheless fail[ed] to fully develop the 
record.”  Wilson, 426 F.3d at 665 n.10.7  Rather, it is a case 
                                                 
 6
 The Commonwealth attempts to distinguish Wilson 
by suggesting our holding there was predicated on the fact 
that the petitioner‟s untimely claim was based on newly 
discovered evidence.  Kelvin‟s case is different, argues the 
Commonwealth, because he had the information necessary to 
bring his conflict-of-interest claim in 1983.  We disagree 
because nothing in Wilson implies that our finding of 
diligence turned on the petitioner‟s newly discovered 
evidence.  Rather, our decision was based on the conclusion 
that Wilson, like Kelvin, had been denied a state evidentiary 
hearing on his claim solely because of an inadequate state 
procedural rule.  See 426 F.3d at 665-66.  The factual 
distinction highlighted by the Commonwealth is thus 
immaterial. 
 7
 The Commonwealth cites Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 
416 (3d Cir. 2007), for the proposition that a state court‟s 
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refusal to hear a claim based on a subsequently invalidated 
state procedural rule does not cure a habeas petitioner‟s prior 
lack of diligence.  In Taylor, the petitioner sought a PCRA 
hearing in state court on numerous claims, including a 
competency claim that he had already raised and for which he 
had already received an evidentiary hearing.  See 504 F.3d at 
436-37.  The state court rejected all of the claims as 
procedurally defaulted. 
 
 Before this Court, the Taylor petitioner cited Wilson 
and argued that he had been diligent with respect to his 
competency claim because the state procedural rule was 
inadequate.  We disagreed, finding the procedural grounds on 
which the state court rejected the claim to be inadequate only 
as to newly raised claims, not as to the previously litigated 
competency claim.  Id. (“Taylor‟s competency claim had 
been fully litigated well before he sought to have the second 
PCRA court consider his new evidence [on the competency 
claim].  To the extent that the state procedural default of 
Taylor‟s claims was inadequate, it only bears on the claims 
that were new to his second PCRA petition.”).  Unlike the 
petitioner in Taylor, Kelvin never received a hearing on his 
conflict claim in state court, though he did request one.   
Accordingly, Taylor provides no support for the 
Commonwealth‟s effort to evade Wilson, where we stated that 
when “a petitioner requests a hearing to develop the record on 
a claim in state court, and if the state courts . . . deny that 
request on the basis of an inadequate state ground, the 
petitioner has not „failed to develop the factual basis of [the] 
claim in State court proceedings‟ for purposes of 
§2254(e)(2).”  426 F.3d at 665 (brackets in original). 
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where the petitioner was denied a hearing on his claim solely 
because the state court applied an inadequate state procedural 
rule. 
 One might argue that Kelvin‟s failure to comply with 
the PCRA‟s one-year statute of limitations means that he did 
not seek a hearing “in the manner prescribed by state law.”  
Williams, 529 U.S. at 427.  But such an argument runs 
headlong into our holding in Bronshtein, where we observed 
that the PCRA‟s time bar was neither “firmly established” nor 
“regularly followed” at the time Kelvin filed his second 
PCRA petition.  404 F.3d at 709-10.  Because of the 
uncertainty surrounding Pennsylvania‟s use of the “relaxed-
waiver rule” at that time, it was effectively impossible for 
Kelvin to fail to comply with Pennsylvania law on statute of 
limitations grounds when filing his second PCRA petition.  In 
Williams, the Supreme Court explained that a finding of 
diligence would turn on whether a petitioner “made a 
reasonable attempt” to pursue his claim “in light of the 
information available at the time.” 529 U.S. at 435.  With no 
“firmly established and regularly applied rule” clearly barring 
Kelvin‟s lengthy delay, Bronshtein, 404 F.3d at 708, his 
belated hearing request was an acceptable attempt to pursue 
his claim in light of the information available to him at the 
time of filing.  Because the Pennsylvania state courts failed to 
hold a hearing and rule on Kelvin‟s conflict-of-interest claim 
“for some reason unrelated to [his] diligence, § 2254(e)(2) 
[does] not apply and a new evidentiary hearing [is] 
permitted.”  Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 436 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
 As the Commonwealth correctly argues, merely 
because a petitioner has complied with state law when 
seeking an evidentiary hearing does not mean that he has 
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been diligent for purposes of § 2254(e)(2).  The jurisdictional 
standard for procedural default of § 2254(a) and the 
evidentiary hearing standard of § 2254(e)(2) are distinct 
provisions that will frequently require separate analyses.  But 
where, as here, a state court gives no reason for denying a 
petitioner‟s hearing request other than his failure to comply 
with a subsequently invalidated state statute of limitations, we 
cannot say that the petitioner was not diligent for purposes of 
§ 2254(e)(2).  Accordingly, we hold that § 2254(e)(2) did not 
prohibit the District Court from conducting an evidentiary 
hearing on Kelvin‟s conflict-of-interest claim. 
B 
 Whenever § 2254(e)(2) does not bar an evidentiary 
hearing, a district court retains discretion to conduct one, 
though this discretion is not unbounded.  Landrigan, 550 U.S. 
at 468; Palmer, 592 F.3d at 393.  The Supreme Court 
instructs that “[i]n deciding whether to grant an evidentiary 
hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing 
could enable an applicant to prove the petition‟s factual 
allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to 
federal habeas relief.”  Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 474.  We have 
interpreted this to require a petitioner to make a “prima facie 
showing” that “would enable [him] to prevail on the merits of 
the asserted claim.”  Palmer, 592 F.3d at 393.  However, “if 
the record refutes the applicant‟s factual allegations or 
otherwise precludes habeas relief,” no evidentiary hearing is 
required. Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 474. 
 We have little trouble concluding that the District 
Court‟s decision to hold a hearing was not an abuse of its 
discretion on the facts of this case.  Kelvin‟s petition 
explained the circumstances of Tucker‟s concurrent 
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representation of Artie in the fall of 1983 and alleged a 
conflict of interest.  As the District Court thoroughly 
explained, the petition‟s allegations, if proven, set forth a 
prima facie case for granting Kelvin habeas relief on this 
basis.  See Morris, 2007 WL 1795689, at *37-*44.  
Moreover, once the Commonwealth‟s procedural default 
argument was dismissed, nothing in the record clearly 
precluded a finding that Kelvin was eligible for habeas relief. 
 When considering whether to hold a hearing, we have 
instructed district “courts [to] focus on whether a new 
evidentiary hearing would be meaningful, in that a new 
hearing would have the potential to advance the petitioner‟s 
claim.”  Campbell, 209 F.3d at 287.  In the present case, it 
was clear that an evidentiary hearing would prove invaluable.  
The District Court recognized the need for further factual 
development of the nature and extent of the attorney-client 
relationship that existed between Tucker and Artie in the fall 
of 1983.  Morris, 2007 WL 1795689, at *43.  Specifically, it 
was necessary to define with precision the nature and duration 
of Tucker‟s involvement in Artie‟s civil suit.  Furthermore, as 
we shall explain, critical issues of material fact remain as to 
whether the alternative strategy of blaming Artie for the 
shooting was plausible under the circumstances.  For these 
reasons, the District Court‟s decision to hold an evidentiary 
hearing on Kelvin‟s conflict-of-interest claim was not an 
abuse of discretion. 
IV 
 The Commonwealth next argues that the District Court 
erred in ordering a new trial because Kelvin waived Tucker‟s 
conflict.  It is well established that where a waiver is validly 
made and accepted by the trial court, “the defendant may 
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[not] later successfully complain about a conflict of interest.” 
United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 749 n.10 (3d Cir. 
1991) (citing United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 
1143, n.84 (3d Cir. 1990)).  Less clear is what happens in 
situations such as this one, where counsel testified that he 
discussed his dual representation with his clients, but did not 
disclose his conflict to the trial court. 
 The Commonwealth argues that the absence of an on-
the-record colloquy by the trial court does not automatically 
preclude a finding that Kelvin validly waived Tucker‟s 
conflict.  It points to the federal court evidentiary hearing, 
where Tucker testified that he privately advised both Kelvin 
and Artie of the dual representation.  According to Tucker, 
both men wanted him to continue representing them despite 
the conflict.  The Commonwealth thus contends that Tucker‟s 
hearing testimony was sufficient to establish that Kelvin 
waived Tucker‟s conflict in spite of the fact that the state trial 
court never made a finding to that effect.  Kelvin, on the other 
hand, contends that a trial court must always conduct an on-
the-record colloquy for a defendant‟s waiver to be valid.  
Under Kelvin‟s approach, a conflicted attorney such as 
Tucker could never obtain a valid waiver from his client 
without the participation of the trial court. 
We agree with the Commonwealth that the absence of 
an on-the-record colloquy does not automatically preclude a 
valid waiver of a conflict of interest.  Such a colloquy is the 
preferred course, however, and we encourage counsel to 
promptly disclose to courts any conflicts of interest that might 
arise. 
 The parties also disagree regarding the burden of proof 
on the waiver issue.  The Commonwealth argues that because 
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Kelvin made no objection at trial, he must prove that he did 
not waive Tucker‟s conflict.  See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 
92 (2004); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938) 
(“Where a defendant, without counsel, acquiesces in a trial 
resulting in his conviction and later seeks release by the 
extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus, the burden of proof 
rests upon him to establish that he did not competently and 
intelligently waive his constitutional right to assistance of 
counsel.”).  Kelvin, by contrast, argues that because the trial 
court made no findings as to waiver, the Commonwealth must 
first prove the existence of a waiver before the burden shifts 
to him to disprove it.  See Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436, 
440 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[I]f the record is silent on whether the 
defendant received the information required [to obtain a valid 
waiver] . . . then the State must bear the burden of showing 
that the waiver was knowing and intelligent.”). 
 Even assuming, arguendo, that the Commonwealth is 
correct that Kelvin bears the burden of proof on this issue, he 
has cited ample evidence from the federal evidentiary hearing 
to support the District Court‟s finding that he did not 
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to conflict-free 
counsel.  Any waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to 
conflict-free counsel “must be made knowingly, intelligently, 
and with awareness of the likely consequences of the waiver.”  
United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1180-81 (3d Cir. 
1978).  A waiver is made “knowingly” and “intelligently” 
only if the “defendant is aware of the foreseeable prejudices 
his attorney‟s continued representation could entail for his 
trial, and possible detrimental consequences of those 
prejudices.” Id. at 1181; see also United States v. Laura, 667 
F.2d 365, 371 (3d Cir. 1981).  The record of the evidentiary 
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hearing demonstrates that Kelvin was not provided with the 
information he needed to make a valid waiver. 
 At the hearing, Tucker merely testified that he “spoke” 
with both Kelvin and Artie about his concurrent 
representation and that both wanted him to continue as their 
attorney.  App. at 138-39.  Unfortunately, Tucker‟s vague 
testimony sheds no light on the content of his waiver 
discussions with Kelvin.  Nowhere does the record suggest, 
for example, that Tucker advised Kelvin of the negative 
consequences that might flow from the conflict.  See United 
States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 
1973) (holding a defendant may waive counsel‟s conflict as 
long as the dangers inherent in joint representation are 
explained).  Nor is there any suggestion that Kelvin was made 
aware of his right to obtain new counsel due to Tucker‟s 
conflict.  Finally, and most significantly, Tucker also 
suggested that he did not perceive his dual representation of 
Kelvin and Artie to present a conflict of interest at the time.  
App. at 127.  Like the District Court, we question whether an 
attorney who admittedly did not understand or appreciate the 
magnitude of his conflict could adequately convey the 
information necessary for his client to make an informed 
waiver.  See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988) 
(“Nor is it amiss to observe that the willingness of an attorney 
to obtain such waivers from his clients may bear an inverse 
relationship to the care with which he conveys all the 
necessary information to them.”).  For all the foregoing 
reasons, we agree with the District Court that Kelvin was 
deprived of the opportunity to make a knowing and intelligent 
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waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free 
counsel.
8 
 
V 
 We turn finally to the merits of Kelvin‟s conflict-of-
interest claim.  Because Kelvin did not object at trial, he must 
“demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely 
affected his lawyer‟s performance.”  United States v. Morelli, 
169 F.3d 798, 810 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 
446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
If Kelvin can make this showing, he “need not demonstrate 
prejudice in order to obtain relief.” Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-
50; Morelli, 169 F.3d at 810. 
 As we noted previously, before holding an evidentiary 
hearing, the District Court concluded that Tucker‟s conflict 
(assuming he had one) adversely affected his representation.  
Accordingly, the evidentiary hearing was held merely to 
determine whether an attorney-client relationship existed 
between Tucker and Artie during the time in question.  At 
that hearing, Kelvin‟s counsel established, in a mere seven 
pages of transcript, that Tucker represented Artie at the 
relevant time before turning the witness over to the 
Commonwealth for cross-examination.  Presumably because 
of Tucker‟s unassailable testimony regarding the existence of 
his attorney-client relationship with Artie, the Commonwealth 
                                                 
8
 For this reason, the Commonwealth‟s reliance on 
United States v. Laura, 667 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1981), is 
misplaced.  In stark contrast to this case, the dangers of joint 
representation were explained to Laura in open court, 
allowing “the trial court . . . to evaluate whether [her] waiver 
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”  Id. at 371. 
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embarked on a line of questioning intended to establish that 
this actual conflict of interest had no bearing on Kelvin‟s trial.  
Because of the District Court‟s previous ruling regarding 
adverse effect, however, the Commonwealth was precluded 
from developing the record in any meaningful way in this 
regard.  As we shall explain, this procedural misstep requires 
us to vacate and remand the case for a new evidentiary 
hearing. 
 After cataloguing the evidence implicating Artie, the 
District Court found the strategy of identifying him as the 
shooter to be an objectively plausible alternative defense.  
The District Court then concluded that Tucker avoided this 
strategy solely because of his loyalties to Artie and his own 
financial stake in Artie‟s civil suit.  To the District Court, it 
was clear that Tucker‟s actual conflict adversely affected his 
handling of Kelvin‟s trial.  We are not so sure. 
 Considered in the abstract, blaming Artie for the 
murder was surely a plausible alternative defense strategy.  
Although the Commonwealth‟s case centered largely on 
eyewitness identifications of Kelvin, other evidence pointed 
to Artie as the shooter.  Flowers, for example, never wavered 
from his initial identification of Artie, even when shown a 
photo array that included pictures of both brothers.  And 
Linaberry—whose testimony was central to the 
Commonwealth‟s case—also initially identified Artie.  
Finally, the composite sketch that police drew after speaking 
with Johnson portrayed a suspect with a damaged eye similar 
to Artie‟s.  When viewed together, this evidence was more 
than sufficient to support an argument that Artie was the 
shooter. 
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 Furthermore, it would be reasonable to infer that 
Tucker avoided this alternative defense because of his loyalty 
to Artie and his financial stake in Artie‟s civil case.  As an 
initial matter, common sense suggests that an attorney would 
be wary of alienating a client with a potentially lucrative civil 
rights claim by accusing him of murder in open court.   And 
as the District Court noted, Tucker testified that he never 
sought to investigate Artie‟s alibi, motive, or opportunity to 
commit the crime.  Moreover, Tucker took actions at trial that 
could be construed as protecting Artie—for example, he 
objected when the Commonwealth asked Linaberry to name 
the person he initially identified and sought to prevent the 
admission of the composite sketch that portrayed a man with 
a damaged eye that resembled Artie. 
 Notwithstanding this evidence, the present record 
leaves us unable to determine whether Kelvin has carried his 
burden of demonstrating that Tucker‟s conflict, in fact, 
adversely affected his representation.  At the hearing, Tucker 
recalled that Kelvin was quite protective of Artie.  App. at 
139.  Accordingly, Tucker suggested Kelvin would not have 
allowed him to portray Artie as the shooter at trial.  App. at 
127, 139.  Specifically, when asked if he would have accused 
Artie of the murder at trial, Tucker stated: “it may have . . . 
come to the point I would not do that based on what 
[Kelvin‟s] position was regarding Artie.”  App. at 139.  And 
when pressed on whether he would have permitted Kelvin‟s 
interest in protecting his brother to dictate trial strategy, 
Tucker replied: “I probably would have favored [Kelvin‟s] 
wishes, especially involving [his] brother.”  App. at 146.  
Finally, Tucker repeatedly suggested that if pointing the 
finger at Artie had been a viable strategy, he would have 
withdrawn from one of the representations.  App. 128, 149.  
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Tucker‟s failure to withdraw from either case suggests that 
accusing Artie of being the shooter was not, in fact, a viable 
strategy. 
 The significance of this testimony is twofold.  First, it 
raises a serious question as to whether portraying Artie as the 
shooter was a plausible alternative defense strategy in light of 
Kelvin‟s apparent unwillingness to accuse his brother of 
murder.  To show that the proffered alternative strategy was 
plausible, Kelvin must demonstrate “that it possessed 
sufficient substance to be a viable alternative.”  Morelli, 169 
F.3d at 810.  However, it would be illogical to say that a 
defense theory presented a “viable alternative” where the 
defendant expressly forbade his attorney from pursuing it.  
The evidence of Kelvin‟s hesitancy causes us to question 
whether the strategy of accusing Artie was “not undertaken 
due to [Tucker‟s] other loyalties or interests.” Morelli, 169 
F.3d at 810 (citing United States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064, 
1070-71 (3d Cir. 1988)).  Moreover, the fact that  a defense 
witness (William Meekins) testified that the perpetrator 
looked nothing like Kelvin and another defense witness 
(Lamont Bruce) testified that three younger men committed 
the shooting, suggests that it would have been against 
Kelvin‟s interest to point the finger at someone (Artie) who 
strongly resembled him. 
 Simply put, Kelvin must show that Tucker‟s conflict 
adversely affected his representation.  Tucker‟s unduly 
truncated testimony at the evidentiary hearing raises  serious 
questions as to whether Kelvin‟s reticence and/or strategic 
considerations consistent with Kelvin‟s best interests—rather 
than Tucker‟s conflict of interest—led Tucker to avoid 
accusing Artie of the shooting.  See Gambino, 864 F.2d at 
1070-71 (“On the other hand, there is no conflict of interest 
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adversely affecting the attorney‟s performance if an attorney 
at trial does not raise a defense on behalf of his client because 
to do so is not in that client‟s interest even though it is also in 
the interest of another client that it not be raised.  To the 
contrary, that is a coincidence of interests.”). 
 Proper evaluation of Kelvin‟s conflict claim thus 
requires more information than the present record provides 
regarding the reason Artie was not implicated in the crime.  If 
Kelvin‟s antipathy to implicating his brother was sufficiently 
strong, it could render the theory implausible.  Cf. Winkler v. 
Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding plea 
bargaining was not a plausible alternative strategy where the 
defendant explicitly stated that he was not interested in a plea 
and instead “asserted” and “insisted” on his innocence to 
defense counsel).  If the facts show that Kelvin‟s wishes and 
his communications with counsel would have led reasonable 
counsel to understand that Kelvin would never agree to 
implicate Artie, then doing so could not have been a 
“plausible alternative” defense.  On the other hand, if the 
facts were such that reasonable counsel would have at least 
attempted to persuade Kelvin of the wisdom of that strategy, 
that approach could have been a “plausible alternative” 
defense.  Finally, Tucker may have decided not to identify 
Artie for legitimate strategic reasons in light of the family 
resemblance between Kelvin and Artie.  We leave these 
issues—as well as any other issues the District Court might 
identify in light of this opinion—for review on remand to the 
District Court. 
VI 
 For all the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
District Court‟s decision to conduct an evidentiary hearing on 
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Kelvin‟s conflict-of-interest claim.  We will likewise affirm 
the District Court‟s holding that Kelvin did not waive his 
Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel.  We will 
vacate the District Court‟s order for a new trial, however, and 
remand the matter for the District Court to conduct a plenary 
evidentiary hearing consistent with this opinion. 
